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This study examines the effect of foreign bank assets and presence on banking stability in the economies 
with strong and weak country-level corporate governance in Africa between 2006 and 2015. Employing a 
Prais-Winsten panel data model on 86 banks in about 30 African economies, the findings on how foreign 
bank assets and presence influence banking stability in strong and weak corporate governance economies 
under different regulatory regimes are reported for the first time in Africa. The initial findings show that 
foreign bank presence and assets promote banking stability. However, the positive effect of foreign bank 
assets and presence is enhanced in economies with strong country-level corporate governance, while the 
positive effect of foreign bank assets and presence is weakened in economies with weak country-level 
corporate governance. After introducing different regulatory variables (regimes), it is observed that the 
enhancing effect of foreign bank presence and assets on banking stability in the full sample and economies 
with strong and weak country level corporate governance systems is deepened or improved under loan 
loss provision regulation regime. However, under the private and public sector-led financial transparency 
regulations, the reducing effect of foreign bank presence and assets on banking stability in economies with 
weak corporate governance systems is further dampened. These findings show that the relationship 
between foreign bank presence and assets is deeply shaped by corporate governance systems and 
regulatory regimes in Africa. Hence, policymakers must build strong corporate governance and sound 
regulatory regimes to enhance how foreign bank operations promote banking stability. 
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Introduction 
Existent literature advance that foreign bank operations (assets and presence) have implications for 
banking operations and activities. For instance, prior studies show that foreign bank assets and presence 
serve as diversification mechanism and aids the introduction of new sophisticated innovations that translate 
into enhanced competition and banking stability (Lee and Hsieh, 2014; Vogel and Winkler, 2012; 2010; 
Hass and Lelyveld, 2006; Hull, 2002). Specifically, Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2002) report that foreign 
banks have a more aggressive response to dealing with deteriorating assets and greater risk absorption 
capacity which promotes stability in the banking system of Latin America. Interestingly, existent literature on 
foreign banks in developing economies have largely focused on how foreign bank assets and presence 
influence banking efficiency and competition (Hass and Lelyeveld, 2006; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2001; Berger, DeYoung, Genav and Udell, 2000b) with these studies mainly studying the “global 
advantage and home field advantage hypothesis.” While the “global advantage hypothesis” advance that 
foreign banks generally have competitive benefits relative to their domestic counterparts, “home field 
advantage hypothesis” states that domestic banks have more insights into and knowledge on the 
dynamisms in the local markets which creates some benefits for them. However, the effect of foreign bank 
assets and presence on banking stability in Africa is limited (see Motelle and Biekpe, 2015; Vogel and 
Winkler, 2010) and yet to be studied. 
 
Moreover, with prior studies showing that weak corporate governance and laxity in supervision and 
regulations contributed to the 2007-2009 global financial instability (Jagannathan, Kapoor and 
Schaumburg, 2013; Mazumder and Ahmed, 2010; Poole, 2010; Crotty, 2009; Carmassi, Gros and Micossi, 
2009), it is clear that corporate governance and regulations help shape banking stability and its related 
factors. For instance, prior studies (Tunay and Yuksel, 2017) show the strong country-level corporate 
governance and tight regulations influence the operations of foreign banks in developing economies. The 
argument is that a strong country-level corporate governance system tames political interventions and 
increases transparency (Tunay and Yuksel, 2017; Ho, Lin and Tsai, 2015) which are all recipes for 
promoting the effect of foreign bank assets and presence on banking stability. Additionally, corporate 
governance systems tend to protect the interest of foreign investors (foreign bank investors) and boost 
investor confidence (Appiah-Kubi, Mansoor, Zaganjori, Sahatqija and Malec, 2020; Shapiro, Tang, Yang 
and Zhang, 2013; Globerman, Shapiro and Tang, 2006; Jones and Pollitti, 2004), and hence leads to 
improved banking stability. While these arguments are intuitively sound and empirically tested in Europe, 
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America and Asia, empirical evidence on the existence of such interrelationship among foreign bank assets 
and presence, corporate governance and regulations on banking stability is yet to be studied in Africa. 
 
From the above, it is clear that the interrelationship among foreign bank activities (assets and presence), 
corporate governance and regulations on banking stability is supported by empirical and intuitive reasoning, 
yet studies that investigate these interrelationships are non-existent especially in Africa. It is against this 
background that this study attempts to provide evidence on how foreign bank assets and presence affect 
banking stability in strong and weak country-level corporate governance systems under different regulatory 
regimes because different regulatory variables (regimes) may yield different outcomes (see Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016; Edwards and Waverman, 2006). There are three main or key contributions to the best of 
authors knowledge in relation to the extant literature and contributions include; (i) provide evidence on how 
foreign banks assets and presence affect banking stability in Africa for the first time; (ii) assess evidence on 
the effect of foreign bank assets and presence on banking stability in strong and weak country-level 
corporate governance economies in Africa for the first time and (iii) examine evidence on how different 
regulatory regimes (variables) influence this interrelationship among foreign bank assets and presence and 
corporate governance on banking stability in Africa for the first time. The rest of the paper is organized into: 
overview of banking stability, regulations, foreign banks and corporate governance in Africa, literature 
review, methodology, empirical results and conclusions and policy implications. 
 
Overview of Banking Stability, Regulations, foreign banks (assets and presence) and corporate 
governance in Africa 
This section presents an overview on the key variables used in this study. From Table 1, yearly trends in 
banking stability (Z-Score), foreign bank assets (FBA), foreign bank presence (FBP), private sector-led 
transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public sector-led transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), loan loss 
provision regulation (LLPR), country-level corporate governance (CLCG), shareholder suit index (ESHS), 
extent of director liability index (ExDL), extent of disclosure (ExD), strength of investor protection (SIP) and 
extent of business disclosure (ExBD) in Africa. Banking stability is represented with z-score which indicates 
a bank’s distance away from experiencing financial distress. In terms of corporate governance, this study 
follows prior studies (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2020; Hillier, Pindado, Queiroz and Torre, 2011) that employed five 
country-level corporate governance structure indexes obtained from Doing Business Database while 
regulations are measured using loan loss provision, private and public sector-led financial transparency 
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regulations. Financial transparency regulation is measured as the percentage of adult population who have 
their credit information mandatorily stored and shared among lenders through private (private credit 
bureaus (PrSLFTR) and public (public credit registries (PuSLFTR)) information sharing institutions. Also, 
the average country level corporate governance (CLCG) is reported and computed as the year average of 
all the five corporate governance indicators and higher values of corporate governance indicators are 
preferred. All the country level corporate governance indexes are scaled over 10 with the exception of SIP 
which is scaled over 25. 
 
Table 1: Trends in Banking Stability, Foreign Bank Assets, Presence, Financial Sector 
Transparency Regulation and Corporate Governance in Africa 
Years Z-Score FBA FBP PrSLFTR PuSLFTR LLPR CLCG ESHS ExDL ExD SIP ExBD 
2006 13.46 40.76 38.53 19.70 2.42 6.45 7.70 6.44 5.13 5.13 16.69 5.13 
2007 13.94 41.71 37.86 20.24 2.81 4.57 7.49 6.21 4.91 5.07 16.18 5.07 
2008 13.76 41.08 40.58 20.05 3.99 5.14 7.45 6.33 5.22 4.71 16.32 4.69 
2009 14.23 43.15 42.24 18.21 4.74 5.62 7.63 6.29 5.48 4.70 16.52 5.14 
2010 14.93 41.64 41.30 19.45 5.82 4.94 7.90 6.28 5.71 5.14 17.19 5.19 
2011 14.22 40.73 42.29 19.16 5.94 4.51 7.94 6.26 5.70 5.25 17.27 5.25 
2012 14.54 41.99 43.61 20.30 6.32 7.15 8.11 6.57 5.64 5.32 17.60 5.41 
2013 14.46 40.05 43.65 20.91 6.64 6.25 8.17 6.64 5.58 5.45 17.74 5.45 
2014 14.77 41.78 43.67 21.06 6.68 5.04 8.29 6.73 5.71 5.47 17.99 5.54 
2015 15.10 40.94 43.71 25.86 7.39 3.97 8.39 6.87 5.71 5.51 18.13 5.74 
Average 14.34 41.45 41.42 20.50 5.27 5.37 7.91 6.46 5.48 5.17 17.16 5.26 
Source: Computed by authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance 
Development and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), foreign bank assets 
(FBA), foreign bank presence (FBP),  private sector-led financial transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public 
sector-led financial transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), extent of 
Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection (SIP) and 
extent of business disclosure (ExBD) 
 
From Table 1, average period banking stability is reported to be 14.34 implying that banks over the period 
under study are about 14.34 points away from financial distress. Also, banking stability appears to be fairly 
unstable given its fluctuations in 2008, 2011 and 2013.  Similarly, foreign bank assets and presence 
reported an average of 41.45% and 41.42% implying that foreign bank assets constituted 41.45% of total 
banking assets over the period under review while foreign banks constituted 41.42% of total banks in Africa 
over the periods under review. This provides evidence that local banks in Africa dominate the banking 
sector of Africa. In terms of financial sector transparency an average of 20.50% and 5.27% are reported 
indicating that mandatory financial regulation on transparency led by the private and public sectors covers 
20.50% and 5.27%, respectively. This shows that private sector-led financial transparency regulation is 
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more vibrant and covers a wider space compared to public sector led financial transparency regulation in 
Africa. Moreover, public sector-led transparency regulation has consistently increased for the period under 
review. Also, loan loss provision presents a period average of 5.37% implying that banks over the period 
under review allocated 5.37% of their total loans as provisions for loan losses. Considering to country-level 
corporate governance, an overall country-level corporate governance index of 7.91 is reported while a 
stable and steady increase in the overall country level corporate governance index is observed. 
Specifically, ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), extent of disclosure index (ExD), extent of director 
liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection (SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD) 
reported period average indexes of 6.46, 5.48, 5.17, 17.16 and 5.26, respectively. These are indications 
that country-level corporate governance in Africa is fairly strong given the periods under review. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Banking Stability and Foreign bank (Assets and Presence) in Strong 
and Weak Corporate Governance Systems – 2006-2015 
 
Source: Graphed by authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance 
Development and Doing Business Databases 
 
To enhance understanding on the relationship between banking stability and foreign bank assets and 
presence in strong and weak corporate governance economies in Africa, Figure 1 is reported. Interestingly, 
Figure 1 graphically shows that banking stability has a positive association with banking presence and 
assets in weak corporate governance economies in Africa. However, in economies with strong corporate 
governance systems in Africa, a negative association is identified between banking stability and foreign 
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bank assets while a positive association is reported between banking stability and foreign bank presence in 
strong corporate governance economies. Given the difference observed in graphical evidence on the 
association between banking stability and foreign banks assets and presence in weak and strong corporate 
governance economies, there is an urgent need for further analysis using more advanced techniques to 
investigate this interrelationship.  
 
Literature Review: Theoretical 
In terms of theoretical and conceptual underpinnings, this study draws inspirations from a number of 
theories and concepts including institutional, regulatory foreign bank ownership theories and concepts. 
First, corporate governance is explained and stems from institutional theories. According to the institutional 
theories literature, institutional theories explain how companies operate and obtain their social, political and 
economic legitimacy in a given economy (Zucker, 1987). Thus, institutions provide rules and define the 
appropriate operational guidelines that discourage inappropriate corporate behavior and the same time 
encourage acceptable corporate behavior (Peters, 2000). In the same vein, corporate governance systems 
also provide a framework that guides corporate dealings and protects the investors and the public at large. 
Furthermore, Scott (1987) states that in addition to the cognitive and normative pillars of institutional 
theories, there is also a regulative pillar of institutional theories which focuses on how institutions regulate 
and are regulated.  
 
According to the attendant literature, two main theories explain regulations: the public interest theory of 
regulations and private interest theory of regulations (Hertog, 2012; Gaffikin, 2005). While the public 
interest theory of regulations advances that regulations seek to protect and benefit the public at large in 
terms of best possible allocation of scarce resources for collective and individual goods (Hantke-Domas, 
2007), the private interest theory of regulations argues that regulations promote the interest of dominant 
individuals and groups in society but not the public interest (Gaffikin, 2005). From the theories of 
regulations, it can be inferred that regulations generally improve and shape banking stability and foreign 
investor interest. 
 
In terms of foreign banks literature, Lee and Hsieh (2014) advance that there is no comprehensive theory of 
multinational banking theory especially in emerging markets or transition economies. However, Berger, 
DeYoung, Genav and Udell (2000b) advance the “global advantage” and “home field advantage” 
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hypothesis. Interestingly, the “global advantage hypothesis” states that foreign banks have competitive 
advantage given that they employ more advanced and sophisticated technologies have higher capital 
adequacy and risk management techniques. These tend to make foreign banks more competitive and 
stable compared to their domestic counterparts. On the contrary, the “home field advantage hypothesis” 
states that foreign banks may be disadvantaged as domestic banks have a good and comprehensive 
understanding of the local banking market and by extension, customer information and knowledge. The 
underlying provides an indication that the operations of foreign banks affect the domestic banking system 
and offer the opportunity to strengthen the stability of the domestic banking market. 
 
Literature Review: Empirics 
Existent literature on foreign banks in Africa has largely focused on how foreign banks influence banking 
efficiency and competitiveness (Kiyota, 2011; Chen 2009). However, how foreign bank assets and 
presence influence banking stability in African economies with strong and weak country-level corporate 
governance systems under different regulatory regimes is practically nonexistent in the literature. Hence, 
this empirical review will focus on studies which have examined how foreign bank activities influence 
banking industry outcomes with emphasis on the role of country-level corporate governance, institutional 
quality and regulations.  
 
More recently, Wang and Sui (2019) studied the effect of political institutions in host economies on the risk-
taking behavior of foreign banks in emerging markets. Employing a panel of 500 banks across 35 Asian, 
Central Europe and Latin American economies between 2000 and 2013, they show that democracy of 
political institutions boosts foreign bank stability. However, democratic institutions derail foreign banks 
established through mergers and acquisitions, financial institutions with short operational history and 
inefficient operations in host economies. Interestingly, while the positive effect of political institutions on 
banking stability is undermined by deposit insurance system in the host country, sound legal institutions in 
the host country strengthen the effect of political institutions on banking stability. Also, Tunay and Yuksel 
(2017) examined the effect of corporate governance on foreign bank ownership in developing economies. 
Employing annual country level data covering 65 developing economies in a dynamic generalized method 
of moments model, they report that a strong relationship exists between foreign bank operations and 
corporate governance at the country level. Specifically, governance factors such as corruption control, 
political stability, rule of law and flexibility in legal regulations affected foreign bank operations. Again, the 
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operations of foreign banks are stronger in economies with low poverty, high political stability and efficient 
legal systems. 
 
Likewise, Haas, Korniyenko, Pivovarsky and Tsankova (2015) evaluated how bank ownership and the 
Vienna Initiative impacted credit growth during the Great Recession. Employing both panel and cross-
sectional techniques on about 350 banks between 1999 and 2011, they report that both foreign and 
domestic banks significantly reduced their credit extension during the crisis. However, foreign banks that 
participated in the Vienna Initiative were relatively stable lenders compared to their domestic counterparts. 
Moreover, Lee and Hsieh (2014) studied the effect of foreign bank ownership on banking stability under 
different banking reforms using banks in Asian countries. Employing the dynamic generalized method of 
moments on panel data from 1387 banks across 27 Asian economies between 1995 and 2009, they report 
evidence in support of the “home field advantage hypothesis”, although evidence of the “global advantage 
hypothesis” exist when considering the effect of banking reforms. Also, an inverted U-shape is observed 
from foreign bank ownership to stability indicating that beyond a certain threshold, foreign bank ownership 
may derail banking stability, while a higher degree of credit control liberalization mitigates the dampening 
effect of foreign bank ownership on banking stability. However, liberalization of interest rate control and 
banking supervision significantly enhance banking stability. 
 
More so, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) also compared the performance of foreign and domestic banks in 
Malaysia during the Asian crisis. Employing the difference in difference model on 43 Malaysian banking 
institutions between 1995 and 2001, they found that differences existed among foreign banks in Malaysia. 
That is, foreign banks with strong regional concentration suffered from the crisis as much as domestic 
banks while foreign banks with less concentration in Asia performed better significantly. The difference in 
performance was not explained by availability of support from a parent company, likelihood of being bailed 
out or political connections but rather by theories on managerial herding. Furthermore, Crystal, Dages and 
Goldberg (2002) examined the performance of foreign and domestic banks using banks in Latin America 
between 1995 and 2000. Using a broad range of quantitative methods such as agent ratings and composite 
indexes based on CAMEL (i.e. Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity), they show that foreign banks differ from domestic banks. That is, foreign banks are more 
aggressive in responding to deteriorating asset quality and loan growth and have greater loss absorption 
capacity which could help strengthen the financial system of their host countries. Finally, Demirguc-Kunt, 
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Levine and Min (1998) investigated how foreign bank activities influence banking efficiency, likelihood of 
banking crisis and economic growth. Employing bank level data covering banks across 80 economies 
between 1988 and 1995 in weighted least squares pooled models, they show that foreign bank activity 
lowers the chance of a banking crisis, improves banking efficiency and accelerates long run economic 
growth through enhanced domestic banking efficiency. 
 
From the literature review, it is clear that the relationship between foreign bank operations and banking 
stability is a preposition too obvious for a serious debate especially in Asia, Europe and America. However, 
what is nonexistent and calls for empirical investigation is how foreign banks influence banking stability in 
the context of Africa. With prior studies showing that corporate governance, political institutions and 
regulations shape foreign bank operations and banking stability and no such study in Africa, it is intuitive to 
argue and examine how foreign bank operations affect banking stability in strong and weak corporate 
governance systems in Africa under different regulatory regimes. The study hypothesizes that while foreign 
banks may promote banking stability, the effect may be enhanced and weakened in African economies’ 
strong and weak country-level corporate governance systems. Additionally, these effects of foreign bank 
operations on banking stability in strong and weak corporate governance African economies may further be 
improved under different regulatory regimes knowing from prior studies (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; 
Edwards and Waverman, 2006) that regulations can enhance financial and economic outcomes. While 
these hypotheses are strongly rooted in theoretical and empirical reasoning, there is no empirical evidence 
to substantiate these claims. Hence, the need for this study. 
 
Methodology and Data 
In this study, a panel data technique is employed to shed insights into the interrelationship among foreign 
banks assets and presence, corporate governance and regulatory regimes and banking stability in Africa. 
The data covers 86 banks across 30 economies in Africa between 2006 and 2015. Bank level data is 
sourced from BankScope, while country-level bank data is sourced from Global Finance Database. 
Additional macroeconomic data is obtained from the World Development Indicators database. Following the 
structure and nature of the data, the panel data approach is used to estimate the results. Baltagi (2015; 
2008) states that the panel data provides more robust and convincing results given that it captures and 
reports both entity and time dimensions of data unlike the cross sectional and time series which report only 
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the entity and time dimensions of data, respectively. Also, the panel data technique is able to control for 
omitted variables (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) and is expressed as: 
Yit=  αi + γt + βXit + εit  ………..( Eq 14.1) 
εit = αi + γt + eit : αi = bank fixed effectγt = time fixed effect  eit =idiosyncratic term  
where: subscript i denotes the cross sectional dimension (bank) i =1. . . N and t reflects the time series 
dimension (time), t=1…T; Yit is the dependent variable; αi is scalar and constant term for all periods (t) and 
specific to a bank fixed effect (i); γt is the time fixed effect t; β is a k×1 vector of parameters to be estimated 
on the independent variables for the explanatory variables; Xit is a 1× k vector of observations on the 
independent variables comprising of independent variables in the model which includes controlled variables 
and εit which is iid is the error term. This study employs the Prais-Winsten estimation technique to control 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity after following a series of standard econometric procedures. 
First, the Breusch_Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (see Appendix 1)  is used to justify the selection 
between ordinary least square (OLS) and generalized least square (GLS) (random effect) while the 
Hausman specification test (see Appendix 2) is used to justify the selection between random and fixed 
effect models. While the Breusch_Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test suggests evidence in support of using 
GLS models, the Hausman specification test provides evidence in favor estimating the results with fixed 
effects models. However, given evidence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the data, the Prais-
Winsten regression which is a GLS estimation technique is employed to control for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity (Prais-Winsten, 1945). 
 
In modelling banking stability, this study follows prior studies (Ozili, 2018; Fernandez et al., 2016; Beck et 
al., 2013) that have assessed banking stability in Africa. In equations 2, the effect of foreign bank 
operations (assets and presence) on banking stability with country-level corporate governance as an 
independent variable but without financial regulation variables (regimes) considerations while in equations 
3, the effect of foreign bank operations (assets and presence) on banking stability in strong and weak 
country-level corporate governance economies in Africa without corporate governance and financial 
regulatory regimes as independent variables. Furthermore, in equations 4, the effect of foreign bank 
operations (assets and presence) on banking stability with country-level corporate governance and financial 
regulation variables (regimes) as independent variables in the model while in equations 5, the effect of 
foreign bank operations (assets and presence) on banking stability in strong and weak country-level 
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corporate governance economies in Africa without country level corporate governance as independent 
variable but with and financial regulatory regimes as an independent variable. These models are estimated 
to highlight the effect of foreign bank operations (assets and presence) in strong and weak country level 
corporate governance and under different regulatory regimes in Africa. 
 
ZSCOREi,t= β0 +β1FOREIGNBANKi,t + β2CLCGj,t+ β3NIMi,t + β4NIIi,t + β5CAPi,t + β6CIi,t+ β7HERFi,t + 
β8SIZEi,t + β9GDPCj,t + β10LERNERj,t+ β11INFLATIONj,t + β12FINCRISESt + εi,t,   ..… (Eq. 2) 
 
ZSCOREi,t= β0 +β1FOREIGNBANKi,t + β2NIMi,t + β3NIIi,t + β4CAPi,t + β5CIi,t+ β6HERFi,t + β7SIZEi,t + 
β8GDPCj,t + β9LERNERj,t+ β10INFLATIONj,t + β11FINCRISESt+ β12FRRj,t + εi,t,   ..… (Eq. 3) 
 
ZSCOREi,t= β0 +β1FOREIGNBANKi,t+ β2CLCGj,t+ β3NIMi,t + β4NIIi,t + β5CAPi,t + β6CIi,t+ β7HERFi,t + 
β8FRRj,t+β9SIZEi,t + β10GDPCj,t + β11LERNERj,t+ β12INFLATIONj,t + β13FINCRISESt + εi,t,   ..… (Eq. 4) 
 
ZSCOREi,t= β0 +β1FOREIGNBANKi,t + β2NIMi,t + β3NIIi,t + β4CAPi,t + β5CIi,t+ β6HERFi,t + β7FRRi,t +β8SIZEi,t 
+ β9GDPCj,t + β10LERNERj,t+ β11INFLATIONj,t + β12FINCRISESt + εi,t,   ..… (Eq. 5) 
 
Variables’ Definition and Selection 
Z-Score is used as a measure for banking stability and computed as capital ratio plus return on assets 
scaled over standard deviation of return on assets (Ozil, 2018; Boyd de Nicolo and Jalal, 2006). The 
resulting value indicates the number of deviations by which the return of a bank would have to fall from the 
mean to erode the equity of a bank; hence measuring how stable a bank is from distress (Boyd and Runkle, 
1993). The literature on foreign operations advance that the operations of foreign banks have huge 
implications for banking activities including stability, competition and efficiency. The general expectation is 
that foreign bank operations improve banking stability (Boateng, Huang and Kufuor, 2015; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007). However, the effect of foreign bank operations improves in economies with strong 
corporate governance systems and further improves under different regulatory regimes (Bermpei et al., 
2018; Tunay and Yuksel, 2017; Haas et al., 2015).  Country-level corporate governance indicators used in 
this study include: ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), extent of disclosure index (ExD), extent of 
director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection (SIP) and extent of business disclosure 
(ExBD). These are used following prior studies (Appiah-Kubi, 2020; Hillier, Pindado, Queiroz and Torre, 
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2011). Additionally, an overall average country-level corporate governance (clcg) is created and used in 
this study where higher values of clcg is preferred. The expectation is that strong governance systems will 
improve the effect of foreign operations (assets and presence) on banking stability while weak corporate 
governance systems will weaken the effect of foreign bank operations on banking stability. In terms of 
financial regulatory regimes, loan loss reserves, private and public sector led financial transparency 
regimes are used. Following the private and public interest theories of regulations, regulations should 
improve the outcomes of financial and economic activities. While this view is valid in the study, we 
additional contend that regulations may weak financial and economic outcomes if the institutions 
(governance systems) are weak. These regulatory regimes are used purely due to availability of data.  
 
Bank interest margin represents banking profitability and used as a determinant of banking stability. 
Following prior studies (Dwumfour, 2017; Islam and Nishiyama, 2016), banking profitability may improve or 
derail banking stability. Thus, profitable banks have the financial muscles to absorb shocks and hence 
improve banking stability. However, when profits are volatile, it may lead to a decline in banking stability. 
Following prior studies (Stiroh, 2004a;b), non-interest income is used to proxy income diversification. The 
argument is that non-interest income reduces the risk of income associated with the core income of banks 
and hence, promotes banking stability. Banking capitalization is measured as natural log of equity and 
signifies the ability of banks to absorb and navigate credit losses and shocks following the risk-return 
hypothesis (see Berger, 1995). Thus, well-capitalized banks can implement sophisticated risk management 
strategies to ensure banking stability (Beck, Jonghe and Schepens, 2013). 
 
Banking operational cost efficiency is measure as operational cost to income and provides an indication of 
how well a bank is able to tame or manage its operating costs (see Athanasoglou et al., 2008). With higher 
values of cost-income ratio indicating poor cost of management, it is expected to reduce stability implying a 
negative relationship. However, a positive relationship is possible when banks spend to maintain their 
stability (Mensah, Andoh, Kuttu and Kusi, 2019). Banking sector concentration is computed using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Following the literature on banking concentration, the concentration-
fragility and concentration-stability hypotheses explain the negative and positive relationships between 
concentration and banking stability, respectively (Kasman and Kasman, 2015; Turk-Ariss, 2010). Bank size 
is measured as the natural logarithm (log) of total assets and explained by the economies and 
diseconomies of scale (Mensah et al., 2019). That is, while the economies of scale advance a positive 
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relationship between size and stability based on the notion that there are efficiency gains associated with 
size, the diseconomies of scale advance a negative relationship between size and stability arguing that 
larger banks have bureaucratic systems, poor supervision and monitoring problems and delays in decision 
making which lead to a weakening of banking stability. Gross domestic product per capita measures the 
standard of living and computed as a ratio of gross domestic product to total population. Following prior 
studies (Jimenez, Lopez & Saurina, 2009), growth in gross domestic product per capita is an indication of 
improvements in loan repayment which promotes banking stability. 
 
The Lerner index or market power of banks is measured as output price less marginal cost scaled over 
price (Beck et al., 2013; Carbo et al, 2009). It reflects the extent to which banks are able to price their 
outputs above the marginal cost hence making them price setters (Tan, 2016). We argue that higher bank 
market power improves banking stability because ability to price output above the marginal cost leads to 
higher banking profitability and stability. Inflation is measured using consumer price index and measures 
economic stability (see Castro, 2012). Following empirical literature, both positive and negative effects of 
inflation on stability are possible. Thus, inflation weakens the ability of bank clients to pay their loans which 
leads to worsening financial positions of banks (see Castro, 2012) and increases credit losses and defaults 
to reduce banking stability. However, if banks are able to anticipate inflation changes and factor it to their 
loan prices, it may improve the banking stability of banks. Hence, the relationship between inflation and 
banking stability is not straightforward. Financial crisis is measured as a dummy which assumes a value of 
1 for years of the recent global financial crises (2007, 2008 and 2009) and 0 otherwise. Generally, financial 
crisis weakens banking stability because crisis leads to lose of confidence in the banking sector. This 
engenders panic withdrawal which magnifies banking instability; hence, a negative relationship between 
financial crisis and banking stability. However, it can be argued that crisis leads to collapse of weak banks, 
engendering a strong and sound banking sector. Thus, a positive link between financial crisis and banking 
stability. Appendix 9 reports the summary of variables used in this study. 
 
Discussions of Empirical Results  
The summary statistics (Appendix 10) is used to screen for outliers which have the possibility of adversely 
influencing the accuracy, consistency and efficiency of the results. Using the mean, maximum and 
minimum values of the variables, there is no evidence of outliers. Additionally, Pearson’s correlation matrix 
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(Appendix 11) is used to screen for multicollinearity and no evidence of multicollinearity is found when the 
multicollinearity threshold is set to 0.5 (see York, 2012; Wichers, 1975).  
 
The main results of this study are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. In Table 2, the effects of foreign bank 
assets and presence are examined on banking stability in economies with strong and weak country-level 
corporate governance in Africa without regulatory considerations. However, in Tables 3, 4 and 5, the effects 
of foreign bank assets and presence are examined on banking stability in economies with strong and weak 
country-level corporate governance in Africa with concentration on loan loss reserve and private and public 
sector-led financial transparency regulations. Each table reports six (6) models with the first-three models in 
each table focusing on how the ratio of number of foreign banks to total banks affect banking stability in 
strong and weak corporate governance economies, while the last-three models focus on how the ratio of 
foreign bank assets to total bank assets affect banking stability in strong and weak corporate governance 
economies. The results cover periods 2006 and 2015 and capture the overall average country-level 
corporate governance variable created. However, corporate governance indexes including shareholder suit 
index (ESHS), extent of director liability index (ExDL), extent of disclosure (ExD), strength of investor 
protection (SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD) are used to split the sample into African 
economies strong and weak corporate governance systems and reported in the Appendix (Appendix 5-8)1 
to ensure brevity of findings and discussions. This helps us to understand how foreign banks influence 
banking stability in Africa in economies with strong and weak corporate governance systems under different 
financial regulations.  
 
From Table 2 where the effects of foreign bank presence (Models 1-3) and assets (Model 4-6) on banking 
stability are examined in strong and weak corporate governance economies in Africa, it is observed that 
both foreign bank presence (Model 1) and assets (Model 4) in the full sample promote banking stability. 
Interestingly, when the sample is split into economies with strong (Models 2 and 5) and weak (Models 3 
and 6) country-level corporate governance, it is evident that the positive effect of foreign bank presence 
and assets on banking stability is improved in economies with strong country-level corporate governance 
systems, while the positive effect of foreign bank presence and assets on banking stability declined in 
                                                             
1In Appendix 5, 6 7 and 8, the effect of foreign banks on banking stability in strong and weak corporate governance 
economies under private sector led transparency regulation, public sector led transparency regulation, loan loss 
provision and no regulatory regimes respectively are reported. In each case, strong and weak shareholder suit 
index (ESHS), extent of director liability index (ExDL), extent of disclosure (ExD), strength of investor protection 
(SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD) are used. 
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economies with weak country-level corporate governance systems. These show that country-level 
corporate governance systems are crucial in shaping foreign bank assets and presence to stimulate 
banking stability in Africa even under no regulatory regime. Interestingly, when loan loss provision, private 
and public sector-led financial transparency regulation regimes are considered in Tables 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively, it is evident that the effect of foreign bank presence and assets in the full sample and 
economies with strong country-level corporate governance systems improve relative to when no regulatory 
regime is considered (Table 2).Similarly, the positive effect of foreign bank presence and assets on stability 
declines in economies with weak corporate governance systems in Africa, especially under the loan loss 
provision regime. More so,  the effect of foreign bank presence and assets on banking stability in 
economies with strong country-level corporate governance systems is still positive under the private and 
public sector-led transparency regulations while negative stability in economies with weak country-level 
corporate governance systems under the private and public sector-led transparency regulatory regimes 
(see Table 4 and 5).These findings clearly show the importance of regulations in reinforcing the effect of 
foreign bank presence and assets in different corporate governance economies within Africa. These 
findings confirms prior studies (Bermpei et al., 2018; Tunay and Yuksel, 2017; Haas et al., 2015) that show 
that corporate governance and regulatory measures are important for shaping how foreign bank presence 
and assets affect banking stability. Interestingly, employing the different indicators of country level 
corporate governance structures (see Appendix 5-8), similar results and findings are observed.  
 
On the control variables, the results report a consistent negative effect of profitability measured as net 
interest margins. Following theories on risk-return, increase in profitability increases risk exposure leading 
to decline in banking stability (see Mensah et al., 2019). Income diversification is found to be positively 
related to banking stability across the models estimated. This is consistent with prior studies (Stiroh, 2004a; 
b), which show that diversification improves banking stability. Banking capitalization is found to be positively 
related to banking stability. As expected, increase in capital provides an indication of banks’ ability to deal 
with risk which ensures banking stability. As expected, cost inefficiency dampens stability just like banking 
concentration and size. The negative relationship between banking concentration is explained by the 
concentration-fragility hypothesis, while the negative effect of bank size is explained by the diseconomies of 
scale concept. Also, gross domestic product per capita is reported to have a positive nexus with banking 
stability. This is not surprising given that improvement in gross domestic product signifies better loan 
repayment and reduced credit risk and default. Bank market power shows a positive effect on banking 
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stability implying that banks that have market power improve banking stability. Inflation is found to be 
positively related banking stability. According, as discussed in the data section, prior studies show that if 
banks are proactive in passing on inflationary shocks to their clients, it may promote their stability. Financial 
crisis presents both positive and negative effects on banking stability. This is consistent with prior studies. 
Interestingly, regulations yield different effects on banking stability depending on the kind of regulation in 
question. For instance, loan loss reserve is reported to promote banking stability across both economies 
with strong and weak country level corporate governance systems. Furthermore, while public sector -led 
financial transparency regulation improved banking stability in the full and economies with strong 
governance systems, public sector-led financial transparency regulation at the same time dampened 
banking stability in economies with weak governance systems. However, private sector-led financial 
transparency regulation consistently impeded banking stability across the entire samples. These confirm 
the findings of prior studies (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Edwards and Waverman, 2006) on how different 
regulations yield varying outcomes depending on some contextual factors like governance systems. 
Interestingly, following Miller (2003) because public sector-led financial transparency institutions are usually 
established by central banks to complement regulatory efforts, it is not surprising to find it improving 
banking stability especially in economies with strong governance systems. However, because private 
sector-led financial transparency institutions are not usually established to complement regulatory efforts, it 





















Table 2: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence and Assets on Financial Stability of Banks in Strong and 
Weak Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – No Regulatory Regime 















FBP 0.0123*** 0.0207*** 0.0040    
 (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0032)    
FBA    0.0109*** 0.0185*** 0.0060** 
    (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0028) 
clcg -0.0057   -0.0197   
 (0.0221)   (0.0216)   
nim1 0.0074 -0.0313** -0.0230 0.0064 -0.0394** -0.0265 
 (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0485) (0.0148) (0.0156) (0.0456) 
nii 0.1174 0.2299** -0.4858 0.2019** 0.1938* -0.2907 
 (0.1007) (0.0970) (0.4224) (0.1014) (0.1001) (0.4043) 
cap 0.8724*** 0.9016*** 0.8477*** 0.8711*** 0.9045*** 0.8497*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0292) (0.0402) (0.0237) (0.0293) (0.0377) 
ci -0.0521*** -0.0950*** -0.0408 -0.0815*** -0.0912*** -0.1116* 
 (0.0201) (0.0222) (0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0238) (0.0578) 
HERF -0.1420* -0.2178** -0.0769 -0.2145** -0.2814** 0.0032 
 (0.0775) (0.0971) (0.1213) (0.0938) (0.1103) (0.1096) 
size -0.8522*** -0.8922*** -0.7371*** -0.8495*** -0.8951*** -0.7344*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0286) (0.0665) (0.0250) (0.0290) (0.0617) 
gdpc 0.0197 0.1570 -0.4164 0.0278 0.2160 -0.4979 
 (0.1698) (0.1124) (0.4523) (0.2236) (0.1662) (0.4413) 
Lerner 1.1221** 0.0591 1.2292* 1.4878*** 0.3156 0.8921 
 (0.4585) (0.4126) (0.7344) (0.4792) (0.4699) (0.7663) 
Inflation 0.0076* 0.0038 0.0069 0.0098** -0.0028 0.0106 
 (0.0046) (0.0066) (0.0073) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0079) 
fincrises -0.0095 0.0720 -0.1837 -0.0433 0.0737 -0.1808* 
 (0.0647) (0.0618) (0.1177) (0.0696) (0.0662) (0.1082) 
Constant 2.4069*** 2.7048*** 2.3709*** 2.4910*** 2.8581*** 2.3542*** 
 (0.3927) (0.1701) (0.5246) (0.3860) (0.2088) (0.4561) 
Observations 367 229 140 351 215 137 
R-squared 0.8390 0.9177 0.8088 0.8547 0.9135 0.8293 
No. of banks 86 52 46 86 52 46 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Computed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance Development and Doing 
Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), foreign bank assets (FBA), foreign bank presence 
(FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap 
– capital adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic 




Table 3: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence and Assets on Financial Stability of Banks in Strong and 
Weak Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Loan Loss Reserve Regime  

















FBP 0.0129*** 0.0220*** 0.0058    
 (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0059)    
FBA    0.0116*** 0.0194*** 0.0092* 
    (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0050) 
clcg -0.0215   -0.0292   
 (0.0267)   (0.0254)   
nim1 0.0148 -0.0397** -0.0221 0.0107 -0.0366** -0.0127 
 (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0501) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0506) 
nii 0.1747* 0.2500** -0.7178 0.2811** 0.2273* -0.4620 
 (0.1053) (0.1184) (0.4578) (0.1136) (0.1271) (0.4251) 
cap 0.8753*** 0.9106*** 0.8422*** 0.8731*** 0.9141*** 0.8512*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0334) (0.0799) (0.0297) (0.0332) (0.0638) 
ci -0.0637*** -0.0803*** -0.0366 -0.0959*** -0.0798*** -0.1214** 
 (0.0226) (0.0249) (0.0301) (0.0353) (0.0255) (0.0561) 
HERF -0.1954** -0.2588** 0.0190 -0.2548*** -0.3644*** 0.0984 
 (0.0838) (0.1025) (0.1240) (0.0977) (0.1164) (0.1320) 
size -0.9043*** -0.9389*** -0.7980*** -0.8956*** -0.9430*** -0.7844*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0363) (0.1079) (0.0357) (0.0361) (0.0810) 
gdpc 0.0084 0.1472 -0.4510 0.0426 0.2201 -0.5655 
 (0.1795) (0.1184) (0.5111) (0.2391) (0.1708) (0.5061) 
Lerner 1.0662** 0.0301 0.8445 1.5308*** 0.3313 0.7033 
 (0.5340) (0.4087) (1.2175) (0.5711) (0.4690) (1.1691) 
Inflation 0.0067 0.0031 0.0063 0.0099* -0.0032 0.0096 
 (0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0051) (0.0085) (0.0066) 
lnLLR 0.0531* 0.0367* 0.1101 0.0464 0.0375* 0.0847 
 (0.0316) (0.0207) (0.1017) (0.0308) (0.0204) (0.0948) 
fincrises 0.0119 0.1012 -0.1598 -0.0136 0.1033 -0.1557 
 (0.0761) (0.0677) (0.1354) (0.0811) (0.0691) (0.1312) 
Constant 2.6963*** 2.8759*** 2.5986** 2.6727*** 2.9398*** 2.3590*** 
 (0.5314) (0.2058) (1.0441) (0.5093) (0.2411) (0.8537) 
Observations 331 209 124 316 195 122 
R-squared 0.8316 0.9063 0.7887 0.8512 0.9159 0.8133 
No. of banks 85 52 45 85 52 45 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Computed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance Development and Doing 
Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), foreign bank assets (FBA), foreign bank presence 
(FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap 
– capital adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic 
product per capital; lerner – market power, inflation – economic stability, fincrises – financial crises, lnLLR – 
loan loss provision  
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Table 4: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence and Assets on Financial Stability of Banks in Strong and 
Weak Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Private Sector-Led Financial 
Transparency Regime 

















FBP -0.0009 0.0136*** -0.0056**    
 (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0023)    
FBA    0.0046*** 0.0122*** 0.0006 
    (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
clcg 0.0680***   0.0543***   
 (0.0158)   (0.0166)   
nim1 0.0183 -0.0145 -0.0199 0.0209* -0.0115 -0.0201 
 (0.0122) (0.0163) (0.0316) (0.0120) (0.0152) (0.0326) 
nii 0.1623* 0.2397** 0.0239 0.2326** 0.2310** 0.1285 
 (0.0971) (0.0951) (0.2732) (0.1054) (0.0958) (0.3041) 
cap2 0.8619*** 0.9051*** 0.7018*** 0.8624*** 0.9055*** 0.7189*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0285) (0.0629) (0.0289) (0.0281) (0.0672) 
ci -0.0276* -0.0965*** 0.0176 -0.0567** -0.0901*** -0.0069 
 (0.0161) (0.0216) (0.0195) (0.0250) (0.0213) (0.0599) 
HERF -0.0868 -0.2112** 0.0536 -0.0958 -0.2838*** 0.0778 






 (0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0751) (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0745) 
gdpc 0.2595** 0.0900 0.3838 0.3016** 0.0466 0.4291 
 (0.1014) (0.1047) (0.3026) (0.1352) (0.1626) (0.3284) 
Lernerindex 0.6189** -0.3178 0.1990 0.8223** -0.4756 1.0004* 
 (0.2867) (0.3843) (0.5173) (0.3636) (0.4791) (0.5836) 
Inflation 0.0092** 0.0087 0.0174*** 0.0129*** 0.0016 0.0192*** 






 (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0135) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0142) 
fincrises 0.0580 0.0196 -0.0622 0.0393 0.0036 -0.0645 
 (0.0411) (0.0611) (0.0683) (0.0437) (0.0674) (0.0719) 
Constant 2.9212*** 3.3047*** 3.2379*** 2.6092*** 3.4157*** 2.5730*** 
 (0.2362) (0.2100) (0.4010) (0.2605) (0.2193) (0.3770) 
       
Observations 339 229 112 323 215 109 
R-squared 0.8976 0.9207 0.9220 0.9054 0.9229 0.9238 
No. of banks 76 52 36 76 52 36 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Computed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance Development and Doing 
Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), foreign bank assets (FBA), foreign bank presence 
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(FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap 
– capital adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic 
product per capital; lerner – market power, inflation – economic stability, fincrises – financial crises; 
PrSLFTR – private sector led financial transparency regulation  
 
 
Table 5: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence and Assets on Financial Stability of Banks in Strong and 
Weak Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Public Sector-Led Financial 
Transparency Regime 

















FBP 0.0064*** 0.0203*** -0.0083***    
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022)    
FBA    0.0087*** 0.0180*** -0.0090*** 
    (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
clcg -0.0178   -0.0063   
 (0.0173)   (0.0169)   
       
nim1 0.0101 -0.0256* -0.0294 0.0144 -0.0260* -0.0410 
 (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0242) (0.0130) (0.0152) (0.0272) 
nii 0.1856* 0.2526*** 0.3061 0.2609** 0.2092** 0.4225* 
 (0.1043) (0.0977) (0.2268) (0.1124) (0.0990) (0.2314) 
cap2 0.8545*** 0.9023*** 0.7360*** 0.8514*** 0.9050*** 0.7533*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0543) (0.0306) (0.0295) (0.0586) 
ci -0.0363** -0.0916*** -0.0554 -0.0552** -0.0846*** -0.0487 
 (0.0177) (0.0216) (0.0348) (0.0263) (0.0218) (0.0571) 
HERF -0.0851 -0.2289** -0.0585 -0.1222 -0.2991*** -0.0133 
 (0.0680) (0.0975) (0.1118) (0.0785) (0.1080) (0.1119) 
size -0.8413*** -0.8938*** -0.7699*** -0.8402*** -0.8970*** -0.8019*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0636) (0.0301) (0.0291) (0.0662) 
gdpc 0.3597*** 0.1915* 0.2210 0.5351*** 0.2693 0.1331 
 (0.1201) (0.1139) (0.2481) (0.1451) (0.1684) (0.2498) 
Lernerindex 1.9777*** 0.1266 0.8165 2.2390*** 0.1713 0.9846* 
 (0.3199) (0.4214) (0.5701) (0.3427) (0.4975) (0.5315) 
Inflation 0.0088** 0.0075 -0.0017 0.0136*** 0.0029 0.0017 
 (0.0043) (0.0068) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0055) 
PuSLFTR 0.0046* 0.0062*** -0.0654*** 0.0041* 0.0072*** -0.0845*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0129) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0158) 
fincrises 0.0924** 0.0736 0.0651 0.0740 0.0698 0.0621 
 (0.0471) (0.0623) (0.0546) (0.0478) (0.0640) (0.0571) 
Constant 2.4221*** 2.6083*** 4.1667*** 2.0926*** 2.7198*** 4.3695*** 
 (0.2931) (0.1613) (0.4389) (0.2774) (0.2044) (0.4684) 
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Observations 339 229 112 323 215 109 
R-squared 0.8727 0.9208 0.9302 0.8950 0.9208 0.9369 
No. of banks 76 52 36 76 52 36 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Computed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators, Global Finance Development and Doing 
Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), foreign bank assets (FBA), foreign bank presence 
(FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap 
– capital adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic 
product per capital; lerner – market power, inflation – economic stability, fincrises – financial crises, 
PuSLFTR – public sector led financial transparency regulation 
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this study, the effect of foreign bank assets and presence is examined on banking stability in the 
economies with strong and weak country-level corporate governance in Africa between the period, 2006 - 
2015. Motivated by limited studies on how foreign bank assets and presence influence banking stability in 
Africa, this study presents evidence for the first time on how foreign bank assets and presence influence 
banking stability in economies with strong and weak country-level corporate governance systems under 
different regulatory regimes. This study employs Prais-Winsten panel model on 86 banks across 30 African 
economies. 
 
The findings show that foreign bank presence and assets promote banking stability. However, the effect of 
foreign bank assets and presence is enhanced in economies with strong country-level corporate 
governance systems, while the effect of foreign bank assets and presence reduces in economies with weak 
country-level corporate governance systems. This finding shows that banking stability is reinforced in 
economies that have stronger corporate governance systems in Africa. After introducing different regulatory 
regimes, it is observed that the enhancing effect of foreign bank presence and assets on banking stability in 
the full sample and economies with strong and weak country-level corporate governance systems is 
deepened or improved under loan loss provision regulation regime. However, under the private and public 
sector-led financial transparency regulations, the reducing effect of foreign bank presence and assets on 
banking stability in economies with weak corporate governance systems is further dampened. These 
findings show that the relationship between foreign bank presence and assets are deeply shaped by 
corporate governance systems and regulatory regimes in Africa. 
 
These findings have some policy implications. First, it is clear the corporate governance systems at the 
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country level can used as a strategy through which foreign bank assets and presence can induce banking 
stability. Hence, African economies will have to build stronger corporate governance systems that can be 
useful for promoting the effectiveness of how foreign bank assets and presence enhance banking stability. 
Second, policymakers can also rely on regulations to enhance the relationship between foreign bank assets 
and presence on banking stability in different contextual setups in Africa. However, policymakers must be 
careful in the selection and implementation of regulatory regimes since some regulatory regimes are more 
effective compared to others. Third, for the purpose of future research, researchers may want to consider 
how political institutions under different regulatory regimes can influence the relationship between foreign 
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Appendix 2: Hausman (1978) Specification  
Chi-square test value = 55.6  
P-Value =0.000 
 
Appendix 3: Modified Wald Test for GroupwiseHeteroskedasticity 
Ho: sigma(i)^2= sigma^2 for all i 
Chi2 (77)= 1.7e+05 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
 
Appendix 4: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in panel data 






























Appendix 5: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence on Financial Stability across Strong and Weak 
Different Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Private Sector-Led Financial 
Transparency Regime 
 ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD  ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD 
VARIABLES Strong Corporate Governance Economies  Weak Corporate Governance Economies 
FBP 0.0027 0.0109*** 0.0150*** 0.0091** 0.0159***  0.0118*** -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0020 
 (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0055)  (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
nim1 -0.0242 -0.0246 -0.0109 -0.0295 -0.0091  -0.0438 -0.0114 0.0626*** 0.0671*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0167) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182)  (0.0404) (0.0278) (0.0192) (0.0210) (0.0196) 
nii 0.1438 0.2720** 0.2493** 0.2100* 0.2444**  0.6063* 0.0602 0.2612 0.3485* 0.2535 
 (0.0915) (0.1182) (0.1163) (0.1105) (0.1159)  (0.3516) (0.2264) (0.1852) (0.2009) (0.1848) 
cap2 0.9223*** 0.9001*** 0.9229*** 0.9495*** 0.9271***  0.5262*** 0.6491*** 0.7787*** 0.7380*** 0.7761*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0307) (0.0323) (0.0288) (0.0322)  (0.0664) (0.0895) (0.0479) (0.0534) (0.0486) 
ci -0.0814*** -0.1000*** -0.0948*** -0.1017*** -0.0784***  0.0013 -0.0749** 0.0236 0.0328* 0.0221 
 (0.0210) (0.0332) (0.0251) (0.0220) (0.0268)  (0.0256) (0.0382) (0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
HERF -0.1200* -0.1445 -0.1687* -0.2424** -0.1450  0.1617 -0.0910 0.0896 0.1016 0.0818 
 (0.0630) (0.0890) (0.1013) (0.1005) (0.1024)  (0.1420) (0.1031) (0.0937) (0.0996) (0.0929) 
size -0.9141*** -0.8972*** -0.9203*** -0.9457*** -0.9242***  -0.5773*** -0.6120*** -0.7914*** -0.7530*** -0.7890*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0308) (0.0321) (0.0290) (0.0319)  (0.0760) (0.0867) (0.0515) (0.0574) (0.0521) 
gdpc 0.0476 0.3044* 0.0412 0.0444 0.0329  0.6668* 0.3073* 0.4298 0.4708 0.4145 
 (0.0913) (0.1727) (0.1125) (0.1027) (0.1136)  (0.3895) (0.1743) (0.2659) (0.2894) (0.2638) 
Lernerindex 0.2709 0.3440 -0.2188 -0.2664 -0.2625  0.0296 0.7925 0.1759 0.0887 0.1110 
 (0.2826) (0.5047) (0.5997) (0.4745) (0.6072)  (0.8313) (0.5037) (0.5229) (0.5683) (0.5279) 
Inflationcons 0.0023 0.0024 0.0108* 0.0114* 0.0044  0.0168** 0.0060 0.0174*** 0.0231*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0080) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0069)  (0.0082) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0056) 
PrSLFTR -0.0176*** -0.0084** -0.0092*** -0.0130*** -0.0079***  0.0033 -0.0008 0.0294** 0.0421*** 0.0299** 
 (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0029)  (0.0037) (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0157) (0.0140) 
fincrises 0.0146 0.1108* 0.0108 -0.0106 0.0145  -0.0563 -0.0754 0.0812 0.1050 0.0802 
 (0.0488) (0.0584) (0.0660) (0.0637) (0.0659)  (0.0884) (0.0846) (0.0701) (0.0783) (0.0705) 
Constant 4.1068*** 3.3368*** 3.2776*** 3.8714*** 3.2132***  2.1183*** 2.7835*** 2.8475*** 2.5220*** 2.8818*** 
 (0.2140) (0.3248) (0.3251) (0.2698) (0.3325)  (0.5239) (0.3668) (0.3380) (0.3514) (0.3392) 
            
Observations 247 217 192 185 194  94 124 149 156 147 
R-squared 0.9314 0.9071 0.8849 0.9033 0.8810  0.9041 0.8853 0.9192 0.9061 0.9158 
No. of banks 50 53 41 40 41  27 35 38 42 36 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking 
stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial 
transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), 
extent of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection 
(SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate 
governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital adequacy, ci – cost 
efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – 
market power, inflation – economic stability, fincrises – financial crises, PrSLFTR - private sector led 




Appendix 6: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence on Financial Stability across Strong and Weak 
Different Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Public Sector-Led Financial 
Transparency Regime 
 ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD  ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD 
VARIABLES Strong Corporate Governance Economies  Weak Corporate Governance Economies 
FBP 0.0138*** 0.0155*** 0.0199*** 0.0223*** 0.0207***  0.0059 -0.0059*** -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0028 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0033)  (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0025) 
nim1 -0.0388** -0.0314** -0.0159 -0.0375** -0.0125  -0.0889** -0.0375 -0.0193 -0.0202 -0.0210 
 (0.0168) (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0185) (0.0182)  (0.0370) (0.0255) (0.0242) (0.0250) (0.0245) 
nii 0.1051 0.2460** 0.2584** 0.2191** 0.2609**  0.3096 0.1932 0.1317 0.1761 0.1174 
 (0.1030) (0.1241) (0.1184) (0.1114) (0.1187)  (0.2972) (0.1865) (0.1646) (0.1779) (0.1626) 
cap2 0.9189*** 0.8984*** 0.9205*** 0.9414*** 0.9244***  0.5290*** 0.6320*** 0.7805*** 0.7464*** 0.7804*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0307) (0.0329)  (0.0632) (0.0738) (0.0441) (0.0472) (0.0441) 
ci -0.0840*** -0.0940*** -0.0817*** -0.0957*** -0.0688**  -0.0424 -0.0873*** -0.0118 -0.0171 -0.0108 
 (0.0259) (0.0328) (0.0252) (0.0243) (0.0271)  (0.0313) (0.0331) (0.0212) (0.0262) (0.0206) 
HERF -0.1236* -0.1282 -0.1756* -0.2701*** -0.1556  0.0894 -0.1014 -0.0077 -0.0100 -0.0084 
 (0.0679) (0.0932) (0.1024) (0.1006) (0.1035)  (0.1203) (0.1097) (0.0720) (0.0889) (0.0707) 
size -0.8988*** -0.8937*** -0.9154*** -0.9335*** -0.9204***  -0.5385*** -0.6614*** -0.7774*** -0.7365*** -0.7775*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0307) (0.0327)  (0.0687) (0.0671) (0.0479) (0.0513) (0.0477) 
gdpc 0.2508** 0.5355*** 0.1404 0.1707 0.1157  0.3914 0.1912 0.1669 0.1598 0.1520 
 (0.1137) (0.1795) (0.1219) (0.1168) (0.1227)  (0.3130) (0.1316) (0.2205) (0.2380) (0.2158) 
Lernerindex 1.7299*** 1.1632** 0.1933 -0.0348 0.0492  1.4391** 1.1823*** 0.5798 0.9701* 0.4876 
 (0.3346) (0.4884) (0.6172) (0.5722) (0.6226)  (0.6486) (0.4569) (0.4794) (0.5381) (0.4710) 
Inflation 0.0028 0.0075 0.0074 0.0089 0.0024  -0.0100 -0.0093 0.0075 0.0086 0.0074 
 (0.0038) (0.0092) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0074)  (0.0078) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0053) 
PuSLFTR 0.0031 0.0052** 0.0082*** 0.0061*** 0.0081***  -0.0278*** -0.0696*** -0.0378*** -0.0390*** -0.0390*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021)  (0.0072) (0.0139) (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0056) 
fincrises 0.1048* 0.1567*** 0.0586 0.0541 0.0521  -0.0822 0.1440** -0.0208 -0.0072 -0.0226 
 (0.0540) (0.0601) (0.0677) (0.0640) (0.0678)  (0.0773) (0.0726) (0.0585) (0.0632) (0.0586) 
Constant 2.7254*** 2.5981*** 2.5692*** 2.7932*** 2.5933***  2.6301*** 3.8374*** 3.6722*** 3.2313*** 3.7282*** 
 (0.1985) (0.2036) (0.2118) (0.2264) (0.2119)  (0.3979) (0.3489) (0.3638) (0.3791) (0.3600) 
            
Observations 247 217 192 185 194  94 124 149 156 147 
R-squared 0.9121 0.9109 0.9031 0.9058 0.9003  0.9235 0.9138 0.9262 0.9214 0.9251 
No. of banks 50 53 41 40 41  27 35 38 42 36 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking 
stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial 
transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), 
extent of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection 
(SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate 
governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital adequacy, ci – cost 
efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – 
market power, inflation – economic stability, fincrises – financial crises, PuSLFTR - private sector led 
financial transparency regulation 
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Appendix 7: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence on Financial Stability across Strong and Weak 
Different Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – Loan Loss Reserve Regime 
 ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD 
VARIABLES Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private 
FBP 0.0135*** 0.0260*** 0.0230*** 0.0231*** 0.0225*** 0.0153* -0.0003 0.0032 0.0032 0.0033 
 (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0083) (0.0019) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
nim1 -0.0465*** -0.0314 -0.0291 -0.0346 -0.0285 -0.0249 -0.0135 0.0694*** 0.0704*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0676) (0.0234) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0204) 
nii 0.1377 0.3438** 0.2174* 0.2144 0.2173* 0.1114 -0.1510 -0.0362 -0.0291 -0.0356 
 (0.1116) (0.1586) (0.1300) (0.1350) (0.1299) (0.4505) (0.1931) (0.1903) (0.1930) (0.1899) 
cap 0.9139*** 0.9125*** 0.9487*** 0.9465*** 0.9490*** 0.8433*** 0.8144*** 0.8467*** 0.8450*** 0.8468*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0317) (0.0347) (0.0358) (0.0343) (0.0706) (0.0776) (0.0534) (0.0538) (0.0535) 
ci -0.0929*** -0.1067** -0.0701*** -0.0761*** -0.0683*** -0.0386 -0.0702** -0.0360 -0.0350 -0.0356 
 (0.0283) (0.0418) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0263) (0.0306) (0.0333) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0282) 
HERF -0.1304* -0.1720 -0.3019*** -0.3069*** -0.2984*** -0.1693 -0.2063** 0.0092 0.0137 0.0097 
 (0.0709) (0.1138) (0.0861) (0.1105) (0.0858) (0.2110) (0.0933) (0.0983) (0.1002) (0.0981) 
size -0.9124*** -0.9931*** -0.9507*** -0.9495*** -0.9492*** -0.9492*** -0.6744*** -0.9086*** -0.9074*** -0.9090*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0420) (0.0381) (0.0390) (0.0377) (0.0891) (0.0769) (0.0756) (0.0761) (0.0756) 
gdpc 0.2297** -0.1675 0.1559 0.1515 0.1628 -0.3947 0.1877 -0.2192 -0.2102 -0.2219 
 (0.1161) (0.2951) (0.1226) (0.1256) (0.1214) (0.5298) (0.1304) (0.4079) (0.4124) (0.4086) 
Lernerindex 1.9276*** -0.9949 0.2885 0.2750 0.3797 -0.9726 1.0395** 0.7833 0.8273 0.7323 
 (0.3376) (0.8442) (0.5697) (0.5913) (0.5683) (1.2492) (0.4298) (1.1433) (1.1584) (1.1373) 
Inflation 0.0025 -0.0181 0.0043 0.0045 0.0042 0.0136* -0.0022 0.0118** 0.0126** 0.0120** 
 (0.0039) (0.0156) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0053) 
lnLLR 0.0162 0.0905*** 0.0072 0.0089 0.0046 0.1417 -0.0855*** 0.1066* 0.1070* 0.1069* 
 (0.0203) (0.0342) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0220) (0.0905) (0.0308) (0.0561) (0.0563) (0.0562) 
fincrises 0.1251** 0.0260 0.1133 0.1172 0.1214* -0.0758 -0.0309 0.0135 0.0128 0.0173 
 (0.0607) (0.1083) (0.0711) (0.0743) (0.0705) (0.1332) (0.0663) (0.1204) (0.1215) (0.1197) 
Constant 2.8247*** 3.2937*** 2.6572*** 2.6970*** 2.6420*** 3.1929*** 2.7244*** 2.7514*** 2.7105*** 2.7776*** 
 (0.2347) (0.3739) (0.2702) (0.2846) (0.2690) (1.1134) (0.3617) (0.8175) (0.8249) (0.8117) 
Observations 226 217 171 167 173 107 116 162 166 160 
R-squared 0.9023 0.8465 0.8942 0.8864 0.8979 0.7814 0.9354 0.8383 0.8385 0.8395 
No. of banks 50 62 41 40 41 36 35 47 51 45 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking 
stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial 
transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), 
extent of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection 
(SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate 
governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital adequacy, ci – cost 
efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – 




Appendix 8: Effect of Foreign Bank Presence on Financial Stability across Strong and Weak 
Different Country Level Corporate Governance Structures – No Regulatory Regime 
 ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD ESHS ExD ExDL SIP ExBD 
VARIABLES Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private Private 
FBP 0.0141*** 0.0241*** 0.0223*** 0.0199*** 0.0229*** 0.0154*** -0.0014 0.0033 0.0039 0.0033 
 (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
nim1 -0.0466*** -0.0339 -0.0199 -0.0413** -0.0175 -0.0727 -0.0106 0.0653*** 0.0684*** 0.0648*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0207) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0536) (0.0285) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0219) 
nii 0.1017 0.2374* 0.2373** 0.2029* 0.2421** 0.2172 0.0654 -0.0199 -0.0070 -0.0213 
 (0.1009) (0.1228) (0.1175) (0.1115) (0.1173) (0.3432) (0.2258) (0.1859) (0.1946) (0.1853) 
cap 0.9190*** 0.8994*** 0.9173*** 0.9370*** 0.9208*** 0.8412*** 0.6489*** 0.8540*** 0.8421*** 0.8543*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0251) (0.0323) (0.0302) (0.0322) (0.0381) (0.0875) (0.0338) (0.0344) (0.0339) 
ci -0.0884*** -0.1033*** -0.0899*** -0.0964*** -0.0757*** -0.0323 -0.0746** -0.0357 -0.0306 -0.0358 
 (0.0256) (0.0362) (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0381) (0.0288) (0.0290) (0.0288) 
HERF -0.1275* -0.1951** -0.1627 -0.2614** -0.1421 -0.1653 -0.0910 -0.1013 -0.0751 -0.1011 
 (0.0667) (0.0989) (0.1014) (0.1020) (0.1026) (0.1674) (0.1047) (0.1219) (0.1158) (0.1217) 
size -0.8986*** -0.8889*** -0.9111*** -0.9283*** -0.9154*** -0.8539*** -0.6122*** -0.8232*** -0.8099*** -0.8234*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0259) (0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0319) (0.0458) (0.0837) (0.0434) (0.0436) (0.0435) 
gdpc 0.2289** -0.1331 0.0958 0.1545 0.0748 -0.3844 0.3000* -0.1341 -0.1473 -0.1354 
 (0.1115) (0.2715) (0.1220) (0.1159) (0.1224) (0.4307) (0.1601) (0.3628) (0.3662) (0.3627) 
Lernerindex 1.7269*** -0.9574 0.2380 0.2956 0.1021 -1.3018 0.7962 0.9880 0.9935 0.9742 
 (0.3309) (0.8059) (0.6373) (0.5333) (0.6331) (0.9033) (0.5020) (0.7891) (0.7743) (0.7849) 
Inflation 0.0017 -0.0043 0.0057 0.0057 -0.0003 0.0158 0.0061 0.0104* 0.0128** 0.0104* 
 (0.0036) (0.0125) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0100) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0057) 
fincrises 0.1000* -0.0216 0.0568 0.0633 0.0527 -0.1528 -0.0760 -0.0209 -0.0232 -0.0188 
 (0.0542) (0.0882) (0.0694) (0.0667) (0.0689) (0.1158) (0.0788) (0.1059) (0.1076) (0.1058) 
Constant 2.8131*** 2.8951*** 2.5627*** 2.8468*** 2.6005*** 3.2133*** 2.7676*** 2.3586*** 2.2062*** 2.3690*** 
 (0.2004) (0.2510) (0.2215) (0.2331) (0.2201) (0.5464) (0.3650) (0.5139) (0.5024) (0.5113) 
           
Observations 247 245 192 185 194 122 124 177 184 175 
R-squared 0.9082 0.8759 0.8804 0.8954 0.8803 0.8212 0.8818 0.8495 0.8442 0.8492 
No.of banks 50 63 41 40 41 37 35 48 52 46 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by 
authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking 
stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation (PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial 
transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), 
extent of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection 
(SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate 
governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital adequacy, ci – cost 
efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – 







Appendix 9: Summary of Variables 
Variables Measurements Sources 
Expected 
Sign 
Bank Stability (ZSCORE) 
capital ratio + return on assets / 
standard deviations of return on assets 
computed by authors based on 
data from BankScope 
 
Country Level Corporate 
Governance (CLCG) 
Average of all country level corporate 
governance indicators 
computed by authors based on 
data fromWorld Bank, Doing 
Business + 
Ease of Shareholder suits 
(ESHS) 
The ease of shareholder suits index 
measures how likely plaintiffs are to 
access internal corporate evidence. It 
has six components: (i) whether 
shareholders owning 10% of the 
company’s share capital have the right 
to inspect the Buyer-Seller transaction 
documents before filing a suit; (ii) 
whether shareholders owning 10% of 
the company’s share capital can 
request that a government inspector 
investigate the Buyer-Seller transaction 
without filing a suit; (iii) what range of 
documents is available to the 
shareholder plaintiff from the defendant 
and witnesses during trial; (iv) whether 
the plaintiff can obtain cate-gories of 
relevant documents from the defendant 
without identifying each document 
specifically; (v) whether the plaintiff can 
directly examine the defendant and 
witnesses during trial (0-2); and (vi) 
whether the standard of proof for civil 
suits is lower than that for criminal 
cases. 
World Bank, Doing Business 
project 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/) + 
extent of Disclosure index 
(ExD) 
The extent of disclosure index 
measures the approval and disclosure 
requirements of related-party 
transactions. It has five components: (i) 
whether it is the managing director 
alone, the board of directors, or the 
general meeting of shareholders the 
corporate body who can provide legally 
sufficient approval for the transaction 
(points are assigned depending on 
whether interested directors are 
permitted to vote or not); (ii) whether an 
external body (an independent auditor, 




for example) must review the 
transaction before it takes place; (iii) 
whether disclosure by Mr. James to the 
board of directors or the supervisory 
board is required; (iv) whether 
immediate disclosure of the transaction 
to the public, the regulator or the 
shareholders is required; and (v) 
whether disclosure in periodic filings 
(for example, annual reports) is 
required 
extent of director liability 
index (ExDL) 
The extent of director liability index 
measures when board members can 
be held liable for harm caused by 
related-party transactions and what 
sanctions are available. It has seven 
components: (i) whether shareholders 
can sue directly or derivatively for the 
damage the transaction causes to the 
company; (ii) whether a shareholder 
plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for 
the damage the Buyer-Seller 
transaction causes to the company; (iii) 
whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold 
other executives and directors (the 
CEO, members of the board of 
directors or members of the 
supervisory board) liable for the 
damage the transaction causes to the 
company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays 
damages for the harm caused to the 
company upon a successful claim by 
the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether 
Mr. James repays profits made from 
the transaction upon a successful claim 
by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether 
Mr. James is disqualified upon a 
successful claim by the shareholder 
plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can 
void the trans-action upon a successful 
claim by a shareholder plaintiff. 
World Bank, Doing Business 
project 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/) + 
strength of investor 
protection (SIP) 
The extent of disclosure index, the 
extent of director liability index, and the 
ease of shareholder suit index. The 
index ranges from 0 (little to no investor 
protection) to 10 (greater investor 





extent of business 
disclosure (ExBD) 
Disclosure index measures the extent 
to which investors are protected 
through disclosure of ownership and 
financial information. The index ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating more disclosure. 





Measures the number of individuals or 
firms listed by a private sector 
information sharing institutions with 
current information on repayment 
history, unpaid debts, or credit 
outstanding. The number is expressed 
as a percentage of the adult 
population. 




Measures the number of individuals 
and firms listed in a public credit 
registry with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts, or 
credit outstanding. The number is 
expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population. 
World Development Indicators 
+/- 
Profitability (NIM) Natural log of net interest margins 
computed by authors based on 
data from BankScope +/- 
Non-Interest Income (NII) Non-interest income/ total income 
computed by authors based on 
data from Bank Scope + 
Capitalization (CAP) Natural log of total equity 
computed by authors based on 
data from Bank Scope + 
Efficiency (CI) 
operating expenses / total operating 
income 
computed by authors based on 
data from BankScope - 
Concentration (HERF) (GrossLoans / sum( GrossLoans ))^2 
computed by authors based on 
data from BankScope - 
Foreign bank presence 
(FBP) 
number of foreign banks / total number 
of banks Global Financial Development +/- 
Foreign bank assets (FBA) 
Asset of foreign banks/ total industry 
assets  +/- 
Size natural log of total assets 
computed by authors based on 
data from data -/+ 
Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita (GDPC) 
sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of 
the products / total population World Development Indicators + 
Lerner Index (Lerner) (Price – Marginal Cost)/ Price Global Financial Development + 
Inflation changes consumer price index World Development Indicators -/+ 
Financial Crises Dummy which assumes a value of 1 for Dietrich and Wanzeried, 2011; -/+ 
 35 
(FINCRISES) years 2007, 2008 and 2009 and 0 
otherwise 








Table 10: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 ZSCORE 945 1.64 1.027 -4.228 4.524 
 PRSLTR 777 20.436 25.479 0 66.2 
 PUSLTR 777 5.366 13.842 0 82.6 
CLCG 939 7.908 0.236 1.8 11.400 
 ESHS 947 6.449 2.138 1 10 
 EXDL 947 5.488 2.337 1 9 
 EXD 947 5.164 2.312 0 8 
 SIP 939 17.148 4.948 4 25 
 EXBD 947 5.248 2.244 0 8 
 NIM 739 7.587 2.646 -.511 13.535 
 NII 947 39.500 45.9 -3.333 559.4 
 CAP 965 6.798 3.103 -2.303 13.827 
 CI 939 1.476 8.871 -190.559 129.267 
 HERF 968 7.10 21.60 0 1 
 FOREIGNBANKS 656 41.419 21.388 0 94 
 SIZE 972 8.994 3.178 1.163 16.198 
 GDPC 716 6.90 14.1 -53.6 136.00 
 LERNER 634 29.00 10.40 -8.40 58.00 
 INFLATION 840 8.221 5.618 -.25 47.305 
 FINCRISES 973 .307 .462 0 1 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by authors based on data from World 
Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation 
(PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), extent 
of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection (SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), 
foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest margins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital 
adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – market power, inflation – 







Appendix 11: Pearson’s Correlation 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) ZSCORE 1.000                   
(2) PRSLTR -0.350* 1.000                  
(3) PUSLTR 0.059 -0.308* 1.000                 
(4) ESHS -0.021 0.094* 0.226* 1.000                
(5) EXDL -0.279* 0.456* 0.206* 0.291* 1.000               
(6) EXD -0.137* 0.664* -0.050 0.199* 0.398* 1.000              
(7) SIP -0.197* 0.577* 0.166* 0.658* 0.780* 0.748* 1.000             
(8) EXBD -0.148* 0.656* -0.041 0.170* 0.401* 0.973* 0.725* 1.000            
(9) NIM1 -0.120* 0.379* -0.258* 0.279* 0.087* 0.191* 0.253* 0.161* 1.000           
(10) NII 0.094* -0.315* 0.127* 0.048 0.002 -0.127* -0.042 -0.126* -0.613* 1.000          
(11) CAP2 0.197* -0.226* 0.070* 0.219* -0.061* -0.042 0.047 -0.063* -0.184* 0.615* 1.000         
(12) CI -0.049 -0.049 0.021 -0.022 0.008 -0.055* -0.032 -0.055* -0.075* -0.264* 0.084* 1.000        
(13) HERF 0.079* -0.106* -0.027 -0.117* -0.080* -0.079* -0.123* -0.088* -0.058 0.045 0.127* 0.072* 1.000       
(14) FOREIGNBAN 0.234* -0.508* 0.203* -0.010 -0.121* -0.202* -0.143* -0.207* 0.041 -0.035 0.041 0.007 0.061 1.000      
(15) SIZE 0.102* -0.238* 0.081* 0.233* -0.039 -0.051 0.059* -0.072* -0.193* 0.629* 0.972* 0.080* 0.115* 0.041 1.000     
(16) GDPC 0.074* -0.210* -0.085* -0.043 -0.169* -0.132* -0.168* -0.149* -0.086* 0.048 0.030 0.014 0.023 0.131* 0.028 1.000    
(17) LERNERINDEX 0.311* -0.754* 0.402* 0.146* -0.456* -0.469* -0.388* -0.466* -0.258* 0.219* 0.214* 0.015 0.031 0.453* 0.217* 0.099* 1.000   
(18) INFLATION 0.095* -0.243* -0.271* -0.116* -0.165* -0.225* -0.251* -0.221* -0.128* 0.138* 0.113* 0.052 0.052 0.031 0.121* -0.023 -0.006 1.000  
(19) FINCRISES -0.063* -0.025 -0.068* -0.053 -0.078* -0.101* -0.109* -0.085* -0.068* 0.024 -0.025 0.023 0.004 -0.037 0.002 0.030 -0.136* 0.159* 1.000 
Standard errors in parentheses - Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Source: Graphed by authors based on data from World 
Development Indicators and Doing Business Databases – Note: banking stability (z-score), private sector-led financial transparency regulation 
(PrSLFTR), public sector-led financial transparency regulation (PuSLFTR), foreign bank assets (FBA), ease of shareholder suit index (ESHS), extent 
of Disclosure index (ExD), extent of director liability index (ExDL), strength of investor protection (SIP) and extent of business disclosure (ExBD), 
foreign bank presence (FBP),  country level corporate governance (clcg), nim – net interest mrgins, nii – non-interest income, cap – capital 
adequacy, ci – cost efficiency, herf – concentration, size – bank size, gdpc – gross domestic product per capital; lerner – market power, inflation – 
economic stability, fincrises –financial crises.  
 
 
 
